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Commentary
Of Rankings and Regulation:
Are the U.S. News & World Report Rankings
Really a Subversive Force in Legal Education?
RACHEL F. MORAN*
INTRODUCTION

The description for this symposium on The Next Generation of Law School
Rankings begins with the following statement: "The U.S. News & WorldReport annual
law school rankings are the 800-pound gorilla of legal education . . .affect[ing]

virtually all aspects of law school operations."' The image is one of vigorous, even
ruthless, competition among law schools to be number one. Although the symposium
participants disagree about whether this competition is healthy or destructive, they all
largely accept that it is a robust phenomenon. There is an occasional reference to the
highly regulated nature of legal education, 2 but these are mere asides, not the heart of
the argument. By accepting competition as the dominant motif, a number of puzzles
arise: Why are the rankings relatively stable over long periods oftime despite vigorous
competition? Why has a plethora of alternative rankings systems not emerged? Why do
schools limit their strategies to gaming the U.S. News & World Report ("US.News")

rankings, even when there are perverse consequences, rather than undertake bold
reforms to gain prestige and value in the marketplace?
These puzzles become far less vexing when the dominant paradigm is one of
cooperation rather than competition. In fact, norms of uniformity and standardization
have dominated the world of legal education, substantially limiting law schools' ability
to compete against one another. To advance law's professional stature, the
accreditation process has regulated legal training so that students receive a quality
education and clients get competent lawyers. Given this framework of comprehensive
rules and regulations, no law school has been able to pursue radical innovations
without jeopardizing its accreditation, its reputation, and its future. In a world of highly
constrained competition, schools have few ways to improve their standing through
strategies that upset the prevailing wisdom about how best to deliver legal education.
As a result, law school rankings largely remain stable over time, and different methods
of ranking overall quality yield similar results. With full-bodied competition curbed by
the accreditation process, schools rely on gaming to influence the US. News rankings
rather than strike out in novel directions to gain prominence.

* Robert D. and Leslie-Kay Raven Professor of Law, University of California School of
Law (Boalt Hall). I would like to thank Paul Caron and the Indiana University School of Law
for the opportunity to participate in this symposium on The Next Generation of Law School
Rankings.
1. Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, Symposium on The Next Generation
ofLaw School Rankings Homepage, http://www.law.indiana.edu/front/special/2005rankings_
nextgen/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
2. Nancy B. Rapoport, Eating Our Cake and Having It, Too: Why Real Change Is So
Difficult in Law Schools, 81 IND. L. J. 359, 366 (2006).
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I. RANKINGS, COMPETITION, AND MARKETS: THE KEY THEMES OF THE SYMPOSIUM

Throughout this symposium, there has been an emphasis on how rankings promote
competition, for better or worse, in a market-based system. Consider, for example, the
first panel designed to frame the rankings debate. Richard A. Posner, Cass R. Sunstein,
and Russell Korobkin all characterize the rankings as a way to mediate market choices
by students about where to go to law school. Posner worries that the U.S. News
rankings are too crude a measure for students to rely on in making a decision as
significant as choosing a law school.3 After considering alternative approaches, which
do not substantially alter the ordering of individual schools, he concludes that a
rational law student should use the rankings to identify a tier of prospective schools,
which can then be investigated in greater depth without undue additional expense.4
Sunstein, too, worries about whether the rankings are a sensible way to evaluate
institutions. He suggests as an alternative "a market test, one that relies on the choices
of the people directly involved: students who apply to law schools. '5 Sunstein believes
that a revealed preference ranking based on students' actual choices would be
extremely useful because "[w]hen choosing among schools, students would probably
care what other students choose." In his view, the "information is intrinsically valuable
...[insofar as] it provides a clue to which schools have the most desirable students"
and thus "provides a good heuristic for which school is best."6 After reviewing possible
distortions in a revealed preference ranking, Sunstein arrives at an "[a]mbivalent
[v]erdict" that these preferences are "a highly imperfect proxy for law school quality"
but "of considerable interest in themselves" and less prone to gaming "not to improve
quality, but to obtain a better ranking.",7 For that reason, he urges that a revealed
preference ranking be used to supplement but not supplant other ranking systems.8
Unlike Posner and Sunstein, Korobkin thinks it is wrongheaded to worry about
whether rankings accurately reflect educational quality because "students place a high
value on the school's rank for its own sake," 9 regardless of how well it measures
underlying indicia of excellence. For Korobkin, revealed preferences are everything,
not just another way to measure quality, because legal education is a status good, and
"[t]he best way for a student to signal his high quality ... is to matriculate at a school
where only high-quality students can gain admission."' 0 The rankings serve as a signal
to students about which law schools confer the kind of prestige that ensures
opportunities to obtain the most desirable jobs upon graduation." As a result:

3. Richard A. Posner, Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 13, 13 (2006).
4. Id. at 24.
5. Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test?, 81 IND. L.J. 25, 27 (2006).

6. Id. at 29.
7. Id. at 34.
8. Id.
9. Russell Korobkin, Keynote Address, Harnessingthe Positive Power of Rankings: A
Response to Posner andSunstein, 81 IND. L.J. 35, 41 (2006).
10. Id. at 42.
11. Id.
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Rankings need not attempt to measure the quality of the education offered by the
institution, because, regardless, students will seek out highly ranked schools and
schools will compete for high rankings.
This broad claim is subject to some limitation, to be sure, because when
students select a law school they presumably do not value only the status that
attending a highly ranked law school conveys-they also want a good education
and an enjoyable experience.12

Korobkin finds little cause for concern on this score, though, because "most schools
are perceived as meeting a threshold of educational quality and environmental
amenities, which is essentially guaranteed by ABA [American Bar Association]
accreditation requirements and the strong demand among smart lawyers for jobs as law
professors .... 13
Whatever the differences among these three scholars in framing the rankings debate,
they certainly all agree that competition in the market for legal education is the
foundation for the analysis. The discussion of ranking methodologies does not undercut
this orientation. In their contribution to the symposium, Scott Baker, Stephen J. Choi,
and Mitu Gulati argue that even if the US. News rankings are not an accurate measure
of educational quality, they serve a valuable role in forcing law schools to generate
4
information that would not otherwise have been produced.1 According to Baker, Choi,
and Gulati:
Before US. News, most schools did not share information about faculty
scholarship and hiring, the bar-passage rate and employment status of recent
graduates, the number of books in their library, or student-faculty ratios ....For
obvious reasons, schools that fared poorly on these measures did not publicize the
fact; schools that anticipated a poor performance did not bother to collect the data
at all. In the case of schools that performed well according to a variety of measures
of school quality, we believe that, prior to the US. News ranking, there was a
social norm in the law school community against public bragging.
Because of our hypothesized social norm against bragging and the reluctance
of poorly performing schools to publicize data, much information about law
schools remained hidden before the US. News rankings broke the norm. As a
result of these rankings, otherwise hard-to-obtain information flowed into the

market. 15
In evaluating methodologies, other contributors look at the impact that rankings
16
have had as law schools attempt to game the criteria to improve their position. For

12. Id.at 43.
13. Id. (citation omitted). Korobkin has made similar arguments elsewhere. See Russell
Korobkin, In PraiseofLaw School Rankings: Solutions to Coordinationand Collective Action
Problems, 77 TEx. L. REv. 403 (1998).
14. Scott Baker, Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, The Rat Race as an Information-Forcing
Device, 81 IND.L.J. 53 (2006).
15. Id. at 78-79 (citations omitted).
16. Indeed, it was the theme of gaming the rankings through various ploys, some quite
questionable, that dominated a New York Times article reporting on the proceedings of this
Symposium. Alex Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver,N.Y. TIMEs, July 31,2005, §4A, at 18.
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example, William D. Henderson and Andrew P. Morriss offer empirical data to
demonstrate that law schools other than those in the first tier have engaged in strategic
behavior to raise the median LSAT scores of entering students and thereby boost their
rankings.17 Jeffrey E. Stake offers a comprehensive catalog of the perverse effects that
the rankings have had on law schools, ranging from how to make admissions decisions
to how to structure the curriculum and allocate law school resources.1 8 Stake argues
that "US. News may unwittingly be homogenizing legal education"' 19 because schools
are striving for the optimal mix of inputs that will boost their rankings. Stake believes
that "[a] corollary of this homogenization effect is that schools will find it unrewarding
to seek a market niche., 20 As a result, Stake fears that: "Law schools are in danger of
losing the freedom to create first-class products for the needs of varying consumers and
stakeholders." 2' He calls on "those who publish rankings .. .to try to anticipate
[perverse] consequences" and "do what they can to mitigate them." 22 He also urges
others to develop alternative rankings that "more accurately reflect the quality of
education offered, or create fewer harmful incentives, or both. 23 Finally, Stake offers a
sobering assessment of the gravity of the situation. In his view, "[t]here are deep
national interests in what happens in law schools. The nation should therefore
be
24
concerned about the changes being wrought in the quest for higher ranks.,
Another group of symposium participants ponders the importance of alternative
ranking systems and how such alternatives might best be constructed. Michael Sauder
and Wendy Nelson Espeland contrast the dominance of the US. News rankings in the
law school world with the proliferation of business school rankings.25 According to
Sauder and Espeland, "there are five or six influential business school rankings and a
host of others that receive some attention." 26 The multiple ranking systems offer a
number of benefits. First, with several independent evaluations, the impact of small
changes in a school's position on any one measure becomes less significant than if a
single rank ordering were of paramount importance. 27 Second, the multiple rankings
allow business schools to adopt different strategies to enhance their reputations. As a
result, the rankings do not chill and indeed may even encourage innovation,
differentiation, and experimentation. 28 In contrasting this "variety and openness" with
the uniformity and standardization seen in legal education, one business school dean
observes that:

17. William D. Henderson & Andrew P. Morriss, Student Quality as Measured by LSAT
Scores: MigrationPatternsin the US. News Rankings Era, 81 IND. L.J. 163 (2006).
18. Jeffrey E. Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and
Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229 (2006).

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 242.
Id.at 243.
Id.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at 268.
Michael Sauder &Wendy Nelson Espeland, Strength in Numbers? The Advantages of
Multiple Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 205 (2006).
26. Id. at218.
27. Id. at 220-21.
28. Id. at 222-23.
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Maybe law schools, because of the nature of law, maybe it's better for them to be
more stable and have one curriculum for everybody. It's hard to measure, but I do
think after looking at this for a long time that the rankings of business schools
have created a lot of experimentation ....
Finally, the variability among the rankings undermines the authoritativeness of any one
standard of educational quality. No single measure can become the sine qua non of
excellence. 30 Despite these salutary effects, Sauder and Espeland caution that the legal
education community may not be willing to endorse a proliferation of law school
rankings. Multiple rankings could lead to consumer confusion, increased gaming to
improve a school's position on various measures, and further entrenchment ofrankings
as the way to analyze a school's worth.3'
Despite these reservations, some symposium contributors have followed Sunstein's
lead in considering alternative ways to rank law schools. In an earlier article,
symposium participant Theodore Eisenberg and coauthor Martin T. Wells sought to
assess scholarly impact by counting the number of times a professor's name appeared
in online legal sources. 32 They then used this measure to assess the overall influence of
different law school faculties in shaping the academic debate. Based on this analysis,
Eisenberg and Wells concluded that there were four schools at the top in the mid1990s: Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale. A second cluster of seven schools
included Berkeley, Columbia, Cornell, Michigan, Northwestern, NYU, and Virginia.3 a
As Eisenberg and Wells themselves noted, their methodology produced results not
terribly dissimilar to those published by U.S. News. During the same time period, the
magazine rated Yale, Chicago, Stanford, and Harvard as the top four schools, while
Columbia, Comell, Michigan, NYU, Virginia, Northwestern, and Berkeley occupied
the next seven slots. 34 In short, Eisenberg and Wells's ranking corroborated rather than
countered US. News's assessment of the country's most elite law schools.
To move beyond citation counts like the one used by Eisenberg and Wells, Bernard
S. Black and Paul L. Caron consider the possibility of using data about papers posted
on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) to measure law professors' scholarly
performance. 35 Black and Caron argue that looking at either SSRN downloads or
papers can generate useful information that supplements existing rankings of law
school faculty. The SSRN rankings have a stronger interdisciplinary and international
focus than traditional measures. 36 Moreover, the SSRN measures give greater weight to
junior faculty and upwardly mobile schools than indicia that look at publication in the
top law reviews. 37 Finally, the SSRN measures can easily be updated on a regular

29. Id. at 223.
30. Id. at218.
3 1. Id. at 207, 225-27.
32. Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Ranking and Explainingthe ScholarlyImpact
of Law Schools, 27 J.LEGAL STUD. 373 (1998).

33. Id. at 391 tbl.2.
34. Id. at 396 tbl.4.
35. Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure
Scholarly Performance,81 IND. L.J. 83 (2006).
36. Id. at 85, 112-13.
37. Id. at 85, 113-14.
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basis, while time-consuming citation counts are done at best sporadically. 38 Black and
Caron acknowledge that their proffered alternative has weaknesses of its own,
including biases that favor recent publications, established scholars, particular fields,
industrious "drudges," and white males. 39 Moreover, the SSRN download measure can
be gamed by ambitious and enterprising professors.4 °
Tracey E. George provides a very different approach to ranking law schools. Instead
of looking at the overall productivity of a school's faculty, she focuses on a particular
type of scholarship--empirical legal scholarship---which she believes will be "the next
big thing in legal intellectual thought." 4' She contends that her method "offers two
contributions to law school rankings beyond merely providing intriguing substantive
'4 2
results: a quasi-prospective perspective and an intellectual-environment evaluation.
A number of the schools ranked highly by US. News continue to do well under her
alternative system, but there are definitely some notable changes in position. For
instance, two of her measures, one based on the percentage of faculties with Ph.D.s and
the other an overall score, place Berkeley at the top. 43 Another scale, which looks at
the percentage of faculty with secondary social science appointments, gives the
University of Southern California the coveted number one position. 44 Even so, her third
publication-based measure puts Chicago, Cornell and Harvard in the first, second, and
third spots, respectively. 45Although her method affords enough "upsets" to challenge
the US. News rankings, there is good reason to wonder whether a focus on empirical
legal scholarship will create the kind of ambiguity that multiple business school
rankings generate. The biggest obstacle may be convincing skeptics that empirical
legal scholarship is in fact the "next big thing" and therefore deserves the privileged
place that George accords it. For example, in his symposium paper, Posner criticizes
traditional rankings because they weigh all scholarship, including much that is
"increasingly removed from the concerns important even to practitioners, let alone
students."46 Far from embracing empirical legal scholarship, Posner argues that work
on business law should receive increased attention in the ranking process.47
Despite disagreements about how alternative ranking systems should be constructed,
all of the symposium participants agree that the chosen methodology influences how
law schools allocate resources in competing for students. Each contributor hopes to
channel this robust competition in constructive ways by devising optimal evaluative
criteria. Even the symposium discussion of "Other Voices in the Rankings Debate"

38. Id. at 85, 112.
39. Id. at 113-17.
40. Id.at 115-16.
41. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top
Empirical Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 141 (2006).
42. Id.at 142.
43. Id.at 152 tbl.2; 158 tbl.6.
44. Id.at 153 tbl.3.
45. Id.at 157 tbl.5.
46. Posner, supra note 3, at 22.
47. Id.Professor Korobkin questions whether business law scholarship should be privileged
in the rankings, noting that students probably are not any more interested in this area than in
other areas of legal scholarship and that all scholarship is a public good, which should be
encouraged through inclusion in the ranking system. Korobkin, supra note 9, at 36-37.
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does not fully call into question this image of vigorous market-based competition. In
his paper on how the U.S. News rankings have affected law school admissions, Dean
Alex M. Johnson, Jr. argues that the emphasis placed on median LSAT scores could
sound the death knell for holistic review, an approach central to achieving racial and
ethnic diversity in America's law schools.48 Johnson believes that the United States
Supreme Court's recent decision upholding affirmative action in law school
admissions 4950may prove a hollow victory if legal educators become caught up in an
"arms race" to boost their rankings by attracting students with high LSAT scores.
According to Johnson, there is a persistent gap in the test performance of white and
Asian applicants on the one hand and black, Latino, and Native American applicants
on the other. 5' As a result, overreliance on the LSAT necessarily undermines diversity
and is antithetical to the "whole person" review that the Court52deemed an essential
feature of constitutionally permissible, race-based preferences.
Because US. News relies on the median LSAT score, it is not clear why a law
school's ranking would be affected by affirmative action so long as diversity
admissions remain below the 50% threshold. Johnson does point out that law schools
direct considerable resources to recruiting students with high LSAT scores. 53 Perhaps
these resources could otherwise be devoted to enhancing diversity. In addition,
although Johnson does not explicitly address the issue, the drive to attract students with
high LSAT scores may make diversity admissions appear to overemphasize race. To
the extent that law schools rely heavily on LSAT scores in making admissions
decisions, the greater the weight that must be given to race to overcome the gap in
scores. As the magnitude of racial preferences grows, admissions programs become
increasingly vulnerable to charges that
race no longer operates as a mere plus but
54
instead is the basis for an illicit quota.
Laying the blame for the LSAT "mess" squarely on the US. News rankings,
Johnson urges the American Bar Association's Section on Legal Education to cease

48. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destructionof the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The
PerniciousEffects ofRankings, 81 IND. L.J. 309, 314 (2006).
49. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
50. Johnson, supra note 48, at 349 (citing William D. Henderson, The LSAT, Law School
Exams, and Meritocracy: The Surprisingand UndertheorizedRole of Test-Taking Speed, 82
TEX. L. REv. 975, 977-78 (2004)).
51. Id. at 313, 332-33. Although Johnson emphasizes the gap in LSAT scores, there also
appears to be a disparity in undergraduate grade point averages as well. Linda F. Wightman, The
Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of
Abandoning Race as a Factorin Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 20
tbl.3 (1997); see generally WILLIAM G. BOwEN &DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONGTERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 53-90
(1998) (analyzing the racial achievement gap in American colleges and universities).
52. Johnson, supranote 48, at 314, 357-58.
53. Id.at 350-51.
54. Consider, for example, Richard Sander's recent discussion of how the pluses accorded
to race by the Michigan law school exceeded those used in the undergraduate program. Sander
argues that the Court's decision in Grutter elevated form over substance. In Sander's view,
whatever the law school's claims about its process, it was not engaged in holistic review but in a
quota system. Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis ofAffirmative Action in American Law
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV.367,400-10 (2004).
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making information about median LSAT scores publicly available. Johnson claims that
without credible data, U.S. News will no longer be able to use this criterion in gauging
student selectivity.5 5 Alternatively, he proposes that the Law School Admission
Council (LSAC) complicate the reporting of student scores by providing numbers that
reflect an applicant's competitiveness at a particular law school rather than nationwide.
Under this approach, the LSAT data for different schools will no longer be56
comparable, and it will not be feasible to include this factor in the rankings formula.
Because of his emphasis on the destructive competition that the rankings have
spawned, Johnson does not consider other factors that might make the LSAT a heavily
weighted factor in admissions. In particular, although he alludes in passing to the fact
that "law schools, unlike colleges, all tend to look alike '57 because of regulations
imposed by the accreditation process, he says relatively little about the American Bar
Association's requirement that law school applicants "take a valid and reliable
admission test to assist the school in assessing the applicant's
capability of
58
satisfactorily completing the school's educational program."
To her credit, Dean Nancy Rapoport does challenge some assumptions about
competition in the marketplace for legal education. In describing a strategic planning
process at her own institution, the University of Houston Law Center, Rapoport notes
that "[t]he rankings served as the focus of many of our discussions" because those
involved in the process wanted to be among the top 50 law schools. 59 Despite this
desire to move up, the law school faced significant obstacles:
Part of the reason law schools don't try to stand out from the pack is that they
can't. The tight regulation that comes from the ABA Standards and university
accreditation standards sets outside limits on experimentation. The ABA
Standards regulate everything from the number of minutes of instructional time to
the requirement of class attendance. University accreditation standards provide an
overlay of additional regulation. Non-ABA-accredited schools have more freedom,
just as privately held companies do, but the graduates of those schools don't have
nearly as much
flexibility in terms of bar admissions or employment
6
opportunities. 0
Given this pervasive uniformity and standardization, Rapoport wonders, "why is there
6
such an impassioned quest for 'top 50' status at so many schools, including ours?", 1
Ultimately, she concludes that this quest is in many ways a quixotic one, even if the
competitive impulse is deeply felt. She wonders whether those schools least able to
alter their rankings spend a disproportionate amount of time worrying about them.
Although Rapoport welcomes the strategic planning process at the University of
Houston as an opportunity for introspection, she laments the possibility that change

55. Johnson, supra note 48, at 355-56.
56. Id. at 356-57.
57. Id.at 326.
58.

SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS AND

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS
ABA STANDARDS].

59. Rapoport, supra note 2, at 361.
60. Id. at 366 (citations omitted).

61. Id.at 367.

2004-2005, at 40 (2004) [hereinafter
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will be at best superficial because legal educators tend to follow the leader rather than
pursue bold reforms.62
II.

REGULATION, COOPERATION, AND LEGAL EDUCATION:

CONSTRAINTS ON COMPETITION AND THE IMPACT ON LAW SCHOOL RANKINGS

In responding to the contributions to this symposium, I want to build on Rapoport's
observations by showing that the image of untrammeled competition prompted by the
U.S. News rankings is a mythical and misleading one. In my view, the overriding
features of American legal education are standardization and uniformity, characteristics
that result from a comprehensive accreditation process. By largely ignoring the ways
that professional organizations, particularly the ABA and the Association of American
Law Schools (AALS), monitor and enforce standards ofquality, the symposium debate
misses one of the most significant impediments to robust market-based competition. To
explore the ways in which law schools coordinate the delivery of educational services,
I will begin by briefly describing the history of the accreditation process. Though its
origins are relatively recent, this process has become tremendously powerful in
consolidating the definition of a good legal education. I will then explain how
contemporary accreditation practices contribute to the long-term stability of law school
rankings, the lack of alternative assessment measures, and the narrowly constrained
forms of gaming that often result in response to the rankings.
A. How Law Schools Came to Be Regulated
The rise of the law school accreditation process is relatively recent. In 1927, no
state required that an applicant to the bar be a law school graduate. 63 During the early
part of the twentieth century, however, the number of law schools and law students
increased dramatically. As George B. Shepherd and William G. Shepherd explain:
From 1890 to 1930, the number of law schools tripled, and the number of law
students increased more than eightfold. Most of the new law schools were forprofit night schools; in 1928, two-thirds of law students studied part-time, up from
one-third in 1889. Many of the new schools offered cheap courses of study of
fewer than three years. Most of the new students were from large cities, and many
were immigrants. The new law schools, which were extremely profitable,
64
produced waves of new lawyers who competed with established lawyers.

62. Id.at 369-74.
63.

ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE

1850s To THE

1980s, at 174 (1983); see also Harry First, Competition in the Legal EducationIndustry (I), 53
N.Y.U. L. REV. 311,361 (1978); Marina Lao, DiscreditingAccreditation?:AntitrustandLegal
Education,79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035, 1041 (2001); George B. Shepherd &William G. Shepherd,
Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation and Legal Education, 19 CARDOzo L. REV. 2091,
2114-15 (1998).
64. Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2115. See STEVENS, supra note 63, at 74-81;
First, supra note 63, at 347 n.208.
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As a result, legal educators and lawyers began to worry about the impact of this
unprecedented influx of practitioners into the profession. 65 In addition to concerns
about overcrowding, there were racist, nativist, classist, and anti-Semitic overtones to
against attorneys graduating from night, part-time, and proprietary
the backlash
66
programs.
To assuage anxieties about unrestricted access to the profession, the ABA and the
AALS took steps to tighten admissions standards for law schools and limit eligibility to
the bar.67 In the 1920s, elite law schools began to require that applicants have some
college education and experimented with aptitude testing. 68 Moreover, the AALS,
which numbered among its members the most prestigious institutions, began to exclude
proprietary schools. Proprietary schools played a large part in the expanding
population of new lawyers, and the ABA felt that such schools contributed to
overcrowding of the legal profession.69 Perhaps the most effective step that the ABA
and AALS took to limit entry into the profession was to lobby state legislatures and
supreme courts to require bar applicants to be graduates of accredited law schools.
This reform movement ensured that anyone who apprenticed in a law office or
graduated from a proprietary school could not obtain a license to practice law. 70 The
campaign was so successful that by 1941, forty-one states required students to have
degrees from accredited law schools before they could sit for the bar examination; in
1935, only nine states had such a requirement. 71 Today, all but a handful of states have
adopted this prerequisite with California being the most notable exception.72
As a result of these efforts, law schools found it almost impossible to survive unless
they were accredited. Without accreditation, an institution's graduates were severely
limited in their ability to obtain a license to practice law.73 In order to remain
competitive, most American law schools agreed to the curricular reforms proposed by

65. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 40-48 (1989).

66.

JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN

AMERICA 106-08 (1976); STEVENS, supranote 63, at 100-12; First, supranote 63, at 363; Daria
Roithmayr, Barriersto Entry: A Market Lock-In Model ofDiscrimination,86 VA. L. REV. 727,

758-61 (2000).
67. ABEL, supra note 65, at 48-68; STEVENS, supra note 63, at 160-61; Shepherd &
Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2116-17.
68. Roithmayr, supranote 66, at 758-59; Thomas 0. White, LSAC/LSAS: A BriefHistory,
34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 369, 369-70 (1984).
69. First, supra note 63, at 346-47; Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2116.
70. ABEL, supra note 65, at 46-48; STEVENS, supra note 63, at 99; Shepherd & Shepherd,
supra note 63, at 2116-17.
71. Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2122.
72. ABEL, supra note 65, at 56; Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2122, 2124-25.
California does not treat graduates of accredited and unaccredited schools identically. Students
from unaccredited law schools must take a preliminary examination, or "baby bar," before they
can sit for the regular bar examination. Graduates of accredited law schools are not subject to
this requirement. Id. at 2124-25.
73. ABEL, supranote 65, at 54-56; STEVENS, supra note 63, at 179-80; Lao, supra note 63,
at 1035-36; Mark E. Dykstra, Note, Why Can'tJohnnySitfor the Idaho Bar? The UnfairEffect
ofABA Accreditation Standardson State Bar Admissions Requirements, 3 SAN DIEGO JUST. J.
285, 290 (1995).
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the AALS in its push to standardize legal education.74 Even during the campaign for
accreditation and professionalization in the 1920s, however, prominent critics worried
about the "homogenization" of legal education.75 Over time, what began as minimal
standards grew increasingly comprehensive, eventually addressing admissions
practices, faculty, curriculum, physical facilities, library and financial resources, and
governance practices. 6 The ABA and AALS relied and continue to rely on periodic
site visits to monitor compliance and enforce these wide-ranging requirements.77
By the 1950s, many of the non-accredited law schools had been overtaken or
subdued by their accredited competitors. Law school enrollment and application
numbers hardly changed during this time, which led to a stable market for legal
education. There was little pressure for accreditation standards to accommodate growth
or to restrict access.78 In the 1960s, however, the number of law school applications
grew dramatically. The heightened demand for legal education derived in part from the
arrival of women and people of color in unprecedented numbers at colleges and
universities. 79 Despite new market pressures, supply did not keep pace with demand, in
part because growth in the number of law schools was modest. Indeed, existing
institutions (particularly ABA-accredited schools), rather than new institutions,
accommodated most of the expanded enrollment. 80 During this time, start-up schools
denied entry by the accreditation process protested their exclusion. For example,
Western State University College of Law, a proprietary institution in California,
challenged the ABA's ban on accreditation of for-profit schools. In 1977, the ABA
responded by announcing that it would begin to consider proprietary schools'
applications for accreditation, but it did not accredit any of them in the years that
followed.8 ' Meanwhile, existing schools demanded tighter standards for recognizing
new schools, insisting that "the A.B.A. and the A.A.L.S. should somehow or other...
enforce some system of birth control on American education institutions. They should
be allowed to beget new law schools only if they can clearly show82readiness to support
their child in the style in which that child should be supported.,
In the early 1990s, the demand for legal education declined. As a result, deans at
existing institutions, even elite ones, began to protest the strictures of accreditation
requirements that unnecessarily drove up costs. Fourteen law school deans, including

74. First, supra note 63, at 366-69.
75. STEvENs, supra note 63, at 112-14 (citing a report for the Carnegie Foundation by
nonlawyer Alfred Z. Reed, which questioned the propriety of a unitary approach to legal
education in a pluralistic society); First, supranote 63, at 365-66 (noting concerns in the 1920s
that the law school curriculum was too narrow and standardized).
76. ABA STANDARDS, supranote 58, at 16-19,24-51.
77. Id. at9, 133-34, 136.
78. First, supra note 63, at 399; Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2125.
79.
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80. Harry First, Competition in the LegalEducation Industry (II):An AntitrustAnalysis, 54
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1049, 1057-58 (1979); Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2126.
81. First, supra note 80, at 1082-84; Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2147-48.
82. Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2126-27 (citing views of Professor Walter
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those at Chicago, Harvard, and Stanford, described the accreditation process as "overly
intrusive, inflexible, concerned with details not relevant to school quality (perhaps
even at odds with maintaining quality), and terribly costly in administrative time as
well as actual dollar costs to schools. ' 3 The deans went on to chide the accreditation
process for focusing on inputs, such as the number of seats in the library, rather than
outputs like "the sort of graduates we produce,... the
84 sort of lives they will lead, [and]
...the consequences of our writing and teaching."
Meanwhile, the Massachusetts School of Law, created in the late 1980s to offer
low-cost, streamlined, practice-oriented legal education filed suit against the ABA
when it was denied accreditation. According to the complaint, the ABA's practices
were anticompetitive and violated the antitrust laws.85 Although the lawsuit was not
successful, it prompted the Department of Justice to investigate.8 6 Ultimately, the ABA
signed a consent agreement which eliminated accreditation policies related to
compensation for faculty, restrictions on for-profit schools, and limits on the transfer of
academic credits from unaccredited to accredited institutions.8 7 After additional
on
review, the ABA modified some other requirements as well; these included policies
88
faculty teaching loads, sabbaticals, and calculation of the faculty-student ratio.
Despite challenges to the accreditation process, it has survived largely intact. By
enforcing standards related to so many facets of legal education, the ABA and AALS
have restricted law schools' ability to compete through the pursuit of innovative
reforms. Although designed to protect law students from substandard educational
practices, the accreditation process has not necessarily made applicants better-informed
consumers. For instance, site visits generate substantial amounts of data, but this
information has been largely unavailable to the general public. Indeed, the ABA and
AALS consider themselves ethically obligated to keep their evaluations confidential.8 9
In analyzing law school rankings as an information-forcing device, Baker, Choi, and
Gulati attribute the dearth of information about the merits of law schools to
embarrassment about mediocre performance or a customary norm against bragging. It
seems just as likely that accreditation practices have contributed to the tradition of
silence among law schools. Norms of nondisclosure coordinated through the ABA and
AALS undoubtedly made it far more difficult to break ranks and boast of one's
successes than any informal norm of modesty could have.
Paul L. Caron and Rafael Gely argue that the U.S. News rankings "dragged [legal
education] kicking and screaming ... into establishing markers for organizational

83. An Open Letter to the Deans of the A.B.A. AccreditedLawSchools, M.S.L. L. REv., Fall
1994, at 48, 49.
at 50.
84. Id.
85. Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact ofAntitrust Law on the Legal Profession,67 FORDHAM
L. REv. 415, 435-36 (1998); Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2153; Peter James
Kolovos, Note, Antitrust Law and Nonprofit Organizations: The Law School Accreditation
Case, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 689,689-91 (1996); Andy Portinga, Note, ABA AccreditationofLaw
Schools: An AntitrustAnalysis, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 635, 635-39 (1996).
86. Lao, supranote 63, at 1043-44; Morgan, supranote 85, at 440; Shepherd & Shepherd,
supra note 63, at 2154; Kolovos, supranote 85, at 692-93.
87. Shepherd & Shepherd, supra note 63, at 2154.
88. Id. at 2155.
89. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 137.
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success." 90 In response to institutions' concerns about the pernicious effects of the
rankings, the ABA proposed a standard that would promote reliable dissemination of
information about law schools to prospective students. Although schools generally
expressed support for the concept, many were concerned about the format for
disclosure. 91 In August 1996, the ABA began requiring schools to "publish basic
92
consumer information" in "a fair and accurate manner reflective of actual practice."
Basic consumer information includes data related to admissions, tuition and fees,
enrollment and graduation rates, composition and size of the faculty and
administration, course offerings, library resources, physical plant, job placement, and
bar passage. 93 Each school generates its own information, so no judgments on relative
quality are made. As a result, the U.S. News rankings remain highly influential because
they provide the specific information about status and hierarchy that students want and
need. Indeed, only two years after the ABA adopted its current standard on consumer
disclosure, a group of 164 deans recognized the ongoing power of U.S. News rankings
a letter warning that "Law School Rankings May Be
and sent law school applicants
94
Hazardous to Your Health!",
B. Cooperation,Conformity, and ConstrainedCompetition:
Revisiting Law School Responses to the U.S. News & World Report Rankings
There has been considerable debate about whether the accreditation process is a
legitimate path to professionalism or an illicit cartel. 95 I do not intend to passjudgment
on that question here. Instead, I want to consider how the analysis of law school
rankings changes if cooperation, rather than unbridled competition, is the dominant
paradigm in legal education. Once standardization and uniformity in legal education
are acknowledged, many features of the rankings debate are clarified. The stability of
the rankings, the lack of alternatives to the US. News approach, and the proliferation
of gaming strategies to improve a school's position all become readily understandable.
As I will show, the accreditation process severely constrains competition even in the
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quest for higher rankings. In fact, the U.S. News rankings are not the 800-pound gorilla
in the room, but the monkey on legal education's back.
In framing the discussion of rankings, Posner, Sunstein, and Korobkin are all
influenced by the history of law school accreditation in ways that they do not always
acknowledge and may not even recognize. Pervasive regulation has created a
monolithic image of good legal education. This homogeneity in turn makes it possible
to imagine a measure of quality that can fairly apply to all law schools. This picture of
the good law school is not complicated by institutional pluralism, that is, a range of
diverse schools with distinct approaches to delivering legal education. Consequently,
both Posner and Sunstein can posit a single objectively correct ranking methodology
and then tweak real-world measures to approximate the ideal. Korobkin, though he is
agnostic about measuring quality, is also influenced by the accreditation process. He
makes what seems like a shocking claim: law school rankings can measure status
without regard to the merits of an institution's educational process. In making this
assertion, though, Korobkin rests secure in the knowledge that ABA standards will
ward off the worst transgressions and preserve the integrity of the profession. His claim
is not'so shocking after all when quality
at most schools is "essentially guaranteed by
96
ABA accreditation requirements."
Accreditation requirements establish an apparent consensus about the ingredients of
a good legal education. Because of pervasive standardization and uniformity,
alternative rankings typically yield little in the way of fresh perspectives on quality.
Law schools look so much alike that any overall ranking system generates similar
results. For that reason, Eisenberg and Wells's methodology produced outcomes that
closely approximated the U.S. News rankings of top schools. 97 Narrowly-constructed
measures, such as those that gauge prominence in a particular field, can yield disparate
rank orderings. For example, George's index of empirical legal studies places schools
other than Harvard, Yale, and Stanford in the number one spot.98Even so, these narrow
approaches are not likely to be as influential as overall measures of quality if most law
school applicants remain generalists uncommitted to a specific area of scholarship.
The homogeneity of the law school world could explain why rankings have not
proliferated, as they have for business schools. To compete with the established leader,
US. News, an alternative ranking system would have to offer some added value for law
students choosing among schools. In particular, the ranking would need to generate
credible and meaningful distinctions, not merely corroborate what is already being
reported. Such divergent results seem unlikely because of the standardization of law
schools. Without going into detail, Sauder and Espeland suggest that there is greater
pluralism among business than law schools. For instance, a business school dean
describes how rankings have fostered experimentation, innovation, and differentiation.
He then contrasts this situation with the stability and homogeneity he sees in law
schools. 99 The dean's observations raise an intriguing question: did multiple rankings
promote institutional diversity among business schools, or did institutional diversity
create the market for multiple rankings? Sauder and Espeland do not provide enough
information about the history of accreditation and professionalization in business
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education to answer this question, but it seems entirely plausible that multiple rankings
simply reinforce, rather than create, a differentiated system. Similarly, the dean's
comments suggest that one dominant ranking has produced homogeneity in legal
education. Again, though, it seems just as likely that a lack of differentiation among
law schools hindered the development of multiple rankings. Indeed, the history of
accreditation that I have described suggests a push for uniformity and standardization
that took place long before U.S. News published its first law school rankings in
1987.10
The role of accreditation in establishing common norms should temper any
tendency to attribute widespread practices among law schools solely to the influence of
the U.S. News rankings. For instance, Johnson contends that the weight given to
student selectivity in the rankings has prompted general overreliance on LSAT scores
as law schools vie to boost their standing. This account of the admissions process
leaves out the important ways in which cartel-like practices among law schools have
contributed to the test's central role in admissions. In Barriers to Entry: A Market
Lock-In Model of Discrimination,10 1 Professor Daria Roithmayr argues persuasively
that the dominant admissions standard of LSAT and grades does much more than
enable law schools to signal their excellence in the rankings. This standard also permits
institutions to benefit from a centralized admissions database operated by the Law
and to identify students who will conform to a traditional
School Admissions 0Council
2
law school culture.
Schools that want to adopt alternative admissions criteria face substantial barriers,
which Roithmayr describes as "switching costs.' ' 10 3 One of these costs is a diminished
position in the law school rankings, but it is far from the only one. Schools must invest
in overcoming their own institutional inertia, the commonplace tendency to opt for the
safety of sticking with the status quo.1° 4 In addition, a school that alters its policy
would no longer benefit from the experience of other ABA-accredited institutions in
applying and perfecting conventional admissions criteria.105 Roithmayr notes that law
schools using alternative techniques might have to retool their curriculum and
pedagogy to serve a newly diverse student body, yet another costly and controversial
change. 1' 6 She ultimately concludes that standardization and uniformity in legal

100. Caron & Gely, supra note 90, at 1512-13; see also Michael Ariens, Law School
Brandingand the FutureofLegal Education,34 ST. MARY's L.J. 301,318-22 (2003). Although
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103. Id.at 737.
104. Id.at 775-79.
105. Id.at 779-80.
106. Id. at 781-82. Curricular reform has been a notoriously contentious issue among law
school faculty, and efforts to revamp course offerings have often led nowhere. Rena I. Steinzor
& Alan D. Hornstein, The UnplannedObsolescence ofAmerican LegalEducation, 75 TEMPLE
L. REv. 447, 447 (2002) (describing curricular reform as "tortuous, disruptive, and occur[ing]
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education have played a substantial role in limiting access for people
of color, a
0 7
problem that transcends the rankings and overreliance on the LSAT.1
A model of cooperation among law schools sheds important light on the gaming that
takes place to influence the rankings. Because schools are so thoroughly regulated,
there are relatively few areas in which they have the flexibility to compete.'0 8 Many of
these areas, such as the number of books in the library or dollars spent per student,
involve incremental changes rather than profound innovation. Modest, gradual
improvements are not apt to yield any dramatic change in a law school's standing. As a
result, schools must exaggerate the magnitude of these gains to get noticed, and the
seduction of gaming begins. A number of symposium contributors worry that this kind
of manipulation is counterproductive, and they call on US. News to revamp its
methods to put an end to these destructive practices. Yet, nowhere do these scholars
take a hard look at the constraints on competition that pervasive regulation of legal
education imposes.
This omission is especially disturbing because it seems clear that accreditation
requirements have hampered innovation. A good example involves barriers to online
legal education. Although there are good reasons to worry about abuses of distance
education and virtual law schools, technological change seems destined to make
inroads into the way that legal learning takes place. So far, the ABA's accreditation
standards have taken a highly tentative approach to instruction in cyberspace.' 0 9
Indeed, it is no accident that the first online law school was established in California.
There, graduates of unaccredited schools can sit for the bar, and the state's population
is sufficiently large to ensure demand for a range of legal educational services."110 So
far, California remains an outpost for the virtual law school, as the ABA and AALS
have rejected institutions that rely exclusively or primarily on distance education."'
Surely this type of barrier to innovation should weigh as heavily on the minds of legal
educators as the gaming that results from the U.S. News rankings.
In sum, then, a model of pervasive regulation offers at least as many insights into
the rankings debate as a model of robust competition. By considering the role of
accreditation in promoting standardization and uniformity, I have shown that many
puzzles posed by this symposium can be solved. The largely undifferentiated nature of
law schools explains the stability of the rankings, the lack of alternative measures, and
the allure of gaming. In contemplating reform, scholars therefore must devote at least
as much energy to critiquing lockstep practices in legal education as they do to
decrying the invidious impact of law school rankings.
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CONCLUSION

This symposium starts from the assumption that the U.S. News rankings are a potent
force in legal education because of the vigorous and even destructive competition that
they engender. In fact, law schools are marked by considerable homogeneity. To a
significant degree, the accreditation process creates a monolithic image of how legal
education should be delivered. Any discussion of the market in legal education seems
oddly lopsided when it focuses on the impact of rankings and ignores these other
barriers to innovation. In the end, it may be easier to turn the rankings into an 800pound gorilla in the room than to confront the walls that the legal profession has built
around itself, confining its ability to imagine what the good law school looks like.

